Bilingual News

首页 |  双语新闻 |  双语读物 |  双语名著 | 
[英文] [中文] [双语对照] [双语交替]    []        

Headline numbers rarely add up in China trade deals

来源:FT中文网    2018-02-08 07:24

        British prime minister Theresa May did not come back to London from her visit to China empty-handed last week. According to news reports, British businesses signed £9bn worth of deals with Chinese companies.        英国首相特里萨•梅(Theresa May)上周访华后并未空手回到伦敦。据媒体报道,英国企业与中国企业签署了价值90亿英镑的协议。
        Similarly, after French president Emmanuel Macron visited China earlier this year, it was claimed that €20bn worth of contracts had been signed. These figures pale in comparison, however, with the announcement of investment and trade deals worth $250bn between the US and China when President Donald Trump went to the People’s Republic in November.        同样,今年早些时候法国总统埃马纽埃尔•马克龙(Emmanuel Macron)访华后不久,两国据称签署了价值200亿欧元的合同。然而,与唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)去年11月访华时美中宣布签署的2500亿美元投资和贸易协议相比,这些数字就相形见绌了。
        Neither the Chinese nor the UK, French and US governments informed domestic audiences whether these agreements were definitive or merely memorandums of understanding which have no binding force. It is not uncommon for such non-binding agreements to be signed even when one or more of the parties has no intention of carrying through on any deal.        无论是中国还是英国、法国和美国的政府都没有告诉国内受众,这些协议是确定性的,还是仅仅是没有约束力的谅解备忘录。并不罕见的是,即使有一方或多方无意履行任何协议,它们也会签署这种不具约束力的协议。
        It is likely that the $250bn figure triumphantly touted by Mr Trump is inflated, as most of the deals were previously announced and approved before the president touched down in China. Others are merely pending transactions and therefore should not be considered new deals negotiated by Mr Trump. Indeed, given that the declaration of these deals is often largely politically driven, it is not surprising that figures are often inflated.        特朗普大肆吹嘘的2500亿美元很可能有所夸大,因为大多数交易是在美国总统抵达中国之前宣布和批准的。其他只是待定交易,因此不应被视为特朗普谈判达成的新交易。事实上,鉴于这些交易的宣布在很大程度上往往是受政治驱动的,数字经常被夸大并不奇怪。
        A major obstacle to turning diplomatic declarations into actual deals — and here the Chinese government is no exception — is that commitments made at the governmental level need to be transplanted into the domestic law in order to be implemented.        把外交声明变成实际交易的一个主要障碍——在这方面中国政府也不例外——是政府层面的承诺需要移植到国内法律才能落实。
        For example, two days after Mr Trump ended his China visit, Beijing announced a radical policy to open its financial sector to foreign companies. Limits on foreign ownership of banks, asset managers, securities firms and insurance companies will eventually be scrapped. This is part of China’s move to open up its $40tn financial sector, as well as an attempt to counter the charge that China does not play by the rules in global commerce.        例如,在特朗普结束访华行程两天后,北京宣布了一项向外国公司开放国内金融业的激进政策。对银行、资产管理公司、证券公司和保险公司的外资所有权限制最终将被取消。这是中国开放其40万亿美元金融业举措的一部分,也是为了反驳中国在全球商业中不遵守规则的指控。
        For many years, the US and the EU have criticised China for failing to adhere to the commitment it made to open up its financial sector when it joined the        多年来,美国和欧盟批评中国未能遵守在2001年加入世贸组织(WTO)时做出的开放金融业的承诺。今年1月,美国贸易代表办公室(Office of the United States Trade Representative)发布报告,对北京“履行世贸组织成员义务的方式”表示严重关切。
        World Trade Organization        现在的问题是,中国是否会认真对待它在特朗普访华期间作出的新承诺。许多人揣测中国有没有一个可信的金融体系改革开放时间表和路线图,这是有一定道理的。
        in 2001. And in January, a report by the United States Trade Representative raised serious concerns about Beijing’s “approach to the obligations of WTO membership”.        迄今还没有这样的路线图,而且尚不清楚中国将在多大程度上或者多快降低准入门槛。因此,人们有理由问,北京是真的准备好执行去年11月达成的协议,还是迄今的惰性反映出官僚们对领导层官方政策的无声抵制?
        The question now is whether China will be serious about the new commitments it made during Mr Trump’s visit. Many wonder, with some justification, whether the Chinese have a plausible timetable and road map for the reform and opening-up of its financial system.        许多人认为这种官方政策是在一个重大战略时刻作出的一个政治姿态,目的是缓和与美国的关系,它将在政府官员的办公室抽屉里被悄然遗忘。
        No such road map has so far been forthcoming, and it is not clear how far or how quickly China will lower the barriers to entry. It is reasonable to ask, therefore, whether Beijing is truly ready to implement the agreement reached in November or whether the inertia thus far is a sign of silent bureaucratic resistance to the official policy of the leadership.        因此,落实中国政府的外交声明,将这些声明纳入国内立法是一个漫长的过程。政府签署谅解备忘录或议定书往往只是象征性的。而即使政府在签署时真的打算履行承诺,兑现过程也从来不容易。
        Many see the latter as a political gesture, made at a strategic significant moment in order to smooth ties with the US which will be quietly forgotten by in the office drawers of government officials.        这个过程越长越困难,不兑现承诺的风险就越高。许多变量可能发挥作用:关键官员可能被取代,或者全球条件可能改变,使得协议过时。各国政府(特别是中国政府)喜欢不具有约束力的外交声明,因为它们有灵活性而不用承担法律义务。
        So implementing diplomatic declarations made by the Chinese government and transplanting these into domestic legislation is a long march, to coin a phrase. The Signing of MOUs or protocol agreements by governments is often just symbolic. And even if the government genuinely intended to fulfil its commitments at the time of signing, the process of making these concrete is never easy.        北京方面常常觉得外国国家元首和政府首脑在明显成功的访问之后立即变得更加咄咄逼人,这往往是国内或国际压力的后果。例如,特朗普几乎是刚刚回到美国就提出了针对中国公司和利益的各种贸易保护措施。这样的行为无助于说服中国赶紧兑现其在他访华期间作出的承诺。
        The longer and more difficult the process, the higher the risk of commitments not being honoured. Many variables come into play: key officials could be replaced or there could be a change in global conditions which render an agreement obsolete. Governments, especially China’s, like non-binding diplomatic declarations because they allow for flexibility without legal obligations.        本文作者是美国德杰国际律师事务所(Dechert)中国管理合伙人
        Beijing often feels that foreign heads of state or governments become more aggressive towards China immediately after an apparently successful visit — often as a consequence of domestic or international pressure. Mr Trump, for example, mooted various trade protection measures targeting Chinese companies and interests almost as soon as he set foot back on US soil. Such behaviour will do nothing to persuade China to rush to honour the commitments it made during his visit.        译者/裴伴

OK阅读网 版权所有(C)2017 | 联系我们